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Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are seen as “the
world’s favorite new anti-poverty device” (The Economist,
2010). In part, this statement reﬂects their dual aim of
providing assistance to poor households in the short term
while creating incentives for human capital investments in
children to break the intergenerational transmission of
poverty. Particular attention has been paid to their impacts
on schooling, especially among girls. CCTs typically include
a requirement, or “conditionality,” that children enroll in
and attend school and some, for example Mexico’s
Progresa/Oportunidades provided higher payments for girls’
attendance at school. The gendered focus in education found
in Progresa/Oportunidades reﬂected the juxtaposition of
important social gains to be obtained through increasing girls’
schooling with their lower levels of schooling outcomes. At the
time of the design and initial implementation of Progresa, girls
in Mexico had lower rates of schooling attendance and attain-
ment. Levy (2006) reports that attendance of 14 year-old girls
was 10% lower than for boys of the same age, and among
children aged 15–17, average years of schooling among girls
was 4.7 years compared to 5.5 among boys.
An extensive literature documents that in Latin America
and elsewhere, CCT programs with schooling conditionalities
have led to increases in school participation rates (Behrman &
Skouﬁas, 2010; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009). Impacts on school
enrollment are often larger among children in poorer house-
holds (Filmer & Schady, 2008; Glewwe & Olinto, 2004;
Maluccio & Flores, 2004) and during years of transition into
school or between school levels (de Brauw, Gilligan,
Hoddinott, Moreira, & Roy, 2012; Schady & Araujo, 2008;
Schultz, 2004). Several studies report larger impacts on school-
ing outcomes for girls than boys (Ahmed et al., 2007; de
Brauw et al., 2012; Schultz, 2004). These ﬁndings are consis-
tent with earlier literature reviews showing that income elas-
ticities are typically higher for girls’ schooling than for boys’
schooling (Behrman & Knowles, 1999; Mani, Hoddinott, &
Strauss, 2013).
In this paper, we study the impacts on school enrollment
and school progression (dropout rates, grade progression,
and grade repetition) of the Bolsa Famı´lia program in Brazil.303Bolsa Famı´lia, which began in 2003, is now the largest CCT
program in the world, with more than 12 million beneﬁciary
households in 2012. Initially, the schooling conditionality
under Bolsa Famı´lia covered children aged 6–15 years, but a
complementary program introduced in 2008 called Benefı´cio
Varia´vel Jovem (BVJ) expanded access to transfers with the
schooling conditionality to children aged 16–17 years.
Although the beneﬁts schedule pays larger transfers to older
children under BVJ than to children aged 6–15, transfer
amounts do not diﬀer by gender.
A number of studies have examined the impact of Bolsa
Famı´lia on outcomes related to schooling. Glewwe and
Kassouf (2012) use Brazilian school census data from 1998
to 2005, during which time Bolsa Escola (a predecessor pro-
gram to Bolsa Famı´lia) and Bolsa Famı´lia were gradually
rolled out, to estimate program impacts on primary schooling
outcomes. Using the large school census data sets and taking
advantage of variation in the timing of the introduction of
Bolsa Famı´lia across locations, they develop a model of the
impact of Bolsa Famı´lia on enrollment at the school level that
controls for state and time ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc
and initial-enrollment-speciﬁc time trends. Their impact esti-
mates are identiﬁed under the assumption that, after control-
ling for these local and time eﬀects, the presence of Bolsa
Famı´lia is uncorrelated with any unobserved factors aﬀecting
enrollment decisions. They ﬁnd that the program increased
school enrollment by 5.5–6.5%, reduced dropout rates by
0.4–0.5 percentage points and increased grade promotion rates
by 0.3–0.9 percentage points. Using cross-sectional data from
2006 and matching within the cross section, Schaﬄand (2012)revision accepted: February 1, 2015.
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of approximately 4 percentage points with comparable eﬀects
found for both boys and girls. However, de Oliveira (2007)
who also uses cross-sectional data (from 2005) and matching
within the cross section ﬁnds that Bolsa Famı´lia reduces atten-
dance, lowers grade progression, and increases dropout rates.
Simo˜es (2012) uses school data and OLS regressions, and ﬁnds
no impact on grade progression or dropouts on urban children
in the fourth grade. Nilsson and Sjo¨berg (2013) use
cross-sectional data from 2011 and a regression discontinuity
design and they too ﬁnd that Bolsa Famı´lia reduces school
enrollments, by 2 percentage points for children 6–18 years
and by 5 percentage points found for children 16–18 years
old. Depending on the year chosen, the data set and the impact
evaluation method, the existing literature is clearly inconclu-
sive on whether Bolsa Famı´lia has had an impact on schooling
outcomes.
In this paper, we try to resolve this debate as follows. Rather
than using a secondary or nationally representative
cross-sectional dataset to attempt to measure impacts of Bolsa
Famı´lia, our analysis uses a rich longitudinal household-level
dataset of more than 11,000 households collected speciﬁcally
to evaluate Bolsa Famı´lia, with survey rounds in 2005 and
2009. The longitudinal nature of our data—at the household
level, including some households who started receiving the
program between the rounds and others who did not—allows
us to ensure pre-program balance on a range of characteristics
among the beneﬁciary and non-beneﬁciary households we
compare. This reduces the confounding eﬀects of observables
that aﬀect both program participation and schooling out-
comes, which may account for the inconclusive and inconsis-
tent results found in other studies. The timing of the data
rounds permits studying impacts on older children after the
introduction of BVJ, which speciﬁcally targeted older ages,
unlike most previous evaluations that use data prior to 2008.
The data include households’ reports of children’s school par-
ticipation and grade levels in current and previous years,
allowing a richer analysis of both enrollment and grade tran-
sitions over time. The large sample and broad coverage of the
program permit disaggregations of analysis by sex, age, and
location. We also provide evidence on two dimensions of
impact heterogeneity that are rare for Latin American CCT
programs: (1) comparisons between rural and urban areas,
and (2) comparisons between children within the mandatory
age for schooling (6–14) and older children (15–17).
The key empirical challenge in estimating impacts of Bolsa
Famı´lia is the nonrandomized assignment of the program.
We take advantage of variation in rollout over time and across
municipalities for identiﬁcation. Using propensity-score-
weighted regression (Hirano, Imbens, & Ridder, 2003), we
construct a statistically balanced comparison group of eligible
nonrecipient households, based on preprogram characteristics
of households and municipalities, to estimate impacts on
schooling outcomes. We ﬁnd that disaggregating by sex, age,
and location proves critical in uncovering these eﬀects. Posi-
tive eﬀects of Bolsa Famı´lia on schooling are concentrated
among children aged 15–17. They are also larger and more
precisely measured in rural areas than urban areas, and are
larger and more precisely measured for girls relative to boys.
These impacts reduce the urban–rural gap in schooling attain-
ments but widen the gap between girls and boys. While we
cannot deﬁnitively uncover the mechanisms that generate the-
se results, there is suggestive evidence that the income eﬀect of
Bolsa Famı´lia is only partially responsible for the impacts
observed here. We present speculative evidence that reductions
in the amount of time girls spend on domestic work allowsthem more time to study which accounts for the beneﬁcial
eﬀect of Bolsa Famı´lia on girls’ grade progression.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a descrip-
tion of the Bolsa Famı´lia and BVJ program, focusing on the
education conditionality and highlighting features that moti-
vate our identiﬁcation strategy. Section 3 describes the data,
provides descriptive statistics on the education indicators we
study, and describes our use of the data to construct treatment
and comparison groups. Section 4 describes our identiﬁcation
strategy, including the use of propensity score weighting to
balance preprogram observables across the treatment and
comparison groups. Section 5 presents our results with discus-
sion. Section 6 concludes.2. THE BOLSA FAMI´LIA PROGRAM AND THE POLICY
CONTEXT
(a) The Bolsa Famı´lia program
Transfers associated with Bolsa Famı´lia consist of (1) a con-
ditional variable payment per child aged 0–15 years, for up to
three children, to “poor” households below a per capita
income threshold, and (2) an additional unconditional transfer
to “extremely poor” households below a lower per capita
income threshold. The transfer is conditional on pregnant
women receiving timely prenatal and postnatal care visits, all
children aged 0–5 within the household receiving timely vacci-
nations and growth-monitoring visits, and all children aged
6–15 attending school at least 85% of school days. In 2008,
the complementary BVJ program was introduced, which
added variable payments and a schooling conditionality for
children aged 16 and 17, requiring attendance at least 80%
of school days. After BVJ’s introduction, any household in
Bolsa Famı´lia with children aged 16 or 17 was automatically
part of BVJ following the same eligibility thresholds and with-
out any additional enrollment procedure.
The per capita income thresholds and beneﬁt values for
Bolsa Famı´lia and BVJ have changed over time, roughly to
account for inﬂation. At the program’s inception in 2003,
the per capita monthly income thresholds were R$100
(approximately US$50), for “poor” households and R$50
for “extremely poor” households. 1 The monthly per child
conditional variable payments were R$15 for ages 6–15, and
the monthly unconditional transfer to extremely poor house-
holds was R$50. Table 1 shows the beneﬁt schedule as of
September 2009, near the end of the period we study. Notably,
the BVJ per child payments for children aged 16 or 17 (R$30)
were larger than the per child payments for children aged 6–15
(R$20), but neither beneﬁt type diﬀered by the child’s gender.
To be eligible for Bolsa Famı´lia payments, households must
be listed in a registry, the Cadastro U´nico. That registry con-
tains self-reported information on household demographic
characteristics, household income, and prior participation in
transfer programs. All households are free to register in the
Cadastro. However, municipality-level oﬃcials are responsible
for organizing the registration process, such that there is
substantial heterogeneity across municipalities in targeting
for Cadastro registration, as well as in registration methods
(Lindert, Linder, Hobbs, & de la Brie`re, 2007). 2
Moreover, conditional on registration in the Cadastro, the
criteria for selection into Bolsa Famı´lia diﬀer by municipality.
Beneﬁciaries are selected at the national level, through the fol-
lowing procedure. Each municipality is assigned a quota for a
maximum number of Bolsa Famı´lia recipient households based
roughly on poverty maps. 3 If the number of households in a
Table 1. Beneﬁt schedule for Bolsa Famı´lia and BVJ payments, as of September 2009
Monthly household
income per capita is
less than
Basic beneﬁt
(unconditional
transfer)
Variable beneﬁt
(transfer per child aged 6–15 years fulﬁlling
conditionality, up to three children)
BVJ beneﬁt (transfer per child aged 16–17 years
fulﬁlling conditionality, up to two children)
R$137 (“poor”) – R$20 R$30
R$69 (“extremely poor”) R$62 R$20 R$30
Source: Ministry of Social Development.
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threshold is lower than the municipality’s quota, then all such
households are selected for Bolsa Famı´lia. If the number of
households in a particular municipality with income per capita
below the threshold exceeds the municipality’s quota, priority
is assigned for selecting households into Bolsa Famı´lia roughly
according to the following criteria: (1) lower household
income per capita, and (2) more children aged 0–17 years in
the household. 4 Consequently, while eligibility criteria are
similar across municipalities, two households below the
income per capita threshold with very similar characteristics
may have diﬀerent recipient status due to being in municipali-
ties with diﬀerent quotas and due to diﬀerences in prioritiza-
tion of eligibility criteria across municipalities.
Since Cadastro registration is voluntary, there is likely to be
some dimension of self-selection into the program. Conse-
quently, we condition impact estimates on Cadastro registra-
tion, described below. Second, there are likely to be very
similar households in similar but distinct municipalities that,
due to diﬀerences in municipality-level quotas and prioritiza-
tion, have diﬀerent Bolsa Famı´lia recipient status. This varia-
tion will be key to our identiﬁcation strategy, described in
Section 4. We interpret the municipality-level variation in pro-
cedures as suggesting that, once a large set of household and
municipality characteristics are accounted for, the probability
that a particular household is a recipient of Bolsa Famı´lia is
uncorrelated with the outcomes we consider. 5
(b) Monitoring school attendance
Formal responsibility for monitoring and enforcing the
education conditionality lies with the Ministry of Education.
Teachers in each school collect daily attendance for students,
which is consolidated by school directors, matched to a list
of Bolsa Famı´lia beneﬁciaries given to the school by the muni-
cipality, and sent to the municipal education secretariat on a
regular basis. Every 2 months, the municipalities consolidate
the attendance information and calculate the percentage of
absences each month for each student, to send to the Ministry
of Education. Although monitoring is conducted, in practice
very few households are dropped from the program due to
noncompliance (Lindert et al., 2007). Households typically
receive several warnings from the program, since the goal is
to induce greater compliance rather than to punish house-
holds.
(c) Education policy context in Brazil
Table 2 presents the education structure for primary school
(ensino fundamental, broken up into two stages) and high
school (ensino medio) in Brazil. The schooling structure chan-
ged in November 2005 to include mandatory kindergarten. 6
Prior to the change, schooling was mandatory from ages
7–14 years; classe de alfabetizac¸a˜o (or “CA,” the equivalent
of kindergarten in the United States) was separate fromprimary school and optional before grades one through eight;
and the minimum age for starting grade one was 7 years. After
the change, schooling became mandatory from ages
6–14 years; CA was included as part of primary school, was
renamed “ﬁrst year,” and was made mandatory before the
newly renamed “second through ninth” years; and the mini-
mum age for the “ﬁrst year” became 6 years. If children
entered school on time and proceeded on time, these mandato-
ry ages would correspond to the completion of both stages of
ensino fundamental. 73. THE EVALUATION DATA
(a) Data collection
In 2005, 15,426 households were interviewed under the
supervision of the Centro de Desenvolvimento e Planejamento
Regional. Commissioned by the federal Ministry of Social
Development and referred to as AIBF-1 (Avaliac¸a˜o de Impacto
do Programa Bolsa Famı´lia), this multipurpose survey includ-
ed household-level questions on demographics, living condi-
tions, assets, income, consumption, anthropometry, health,
education, participation in cash transfer and subsidy pro-
grams, and women’s decision making. The sample included
households that in 2005 were already participating in Bolsa
Famı´lia, households that in 2005 were registered in Cadastro
U´nico but not participating in Bolsa Famı´lia, and households
that in 2005 were not in Cadastro U´nico and therefore were
not participating in Bolsa Famı´lia. Households in the North,
Northeast, and Center–West regions were oversampled,
whereas those in the Southeast and South were undersampled.
Sample weights were constructed to make the data nationally
representative.
In 2009, a follow-up survey (AIBF-2) of the same house-
holds was ﬁelded. In AIBF-2 11,433 of the households in the
baseline sample were re-interviewed, implying an annual attri-
tion rate of approximately 6.5%. The main sources of attrition
were ﬁeld teams being unable to physically locate respondents’
recorded addresses and households no longer residing at their
recorded addresses (de Brauw et al., 2012). Given the sig-
niﬁcant attrition, we explored the correlates of attrition and
in our analysis we use attrition weights to take nonrandom
attrition into account (see Appendix A). In both 2005 and
2009, households were asked about their registration in
Cadastro U´nico as well as whether they received transfers.
Thus, we are able to observe household Cadastro registration
and Bolsa Famı´lia transfer receipt in both rounds.
(b) Education variables
The 2005 and 2009 surveys include information on school-
ing for each household member, including whether the house-
hold member is currently in school and the corresponding
course/level, the previous year’s enrollment status and
Table 2. Education structure in Brazil, before and after November 24, 2005
U.S. equivalent Before Nov. 24, 2005 After Nov. 24, 2005
Age Course (“curso”) Level (“serie”) Age Course (“curso”) Level (“serie”)
Kindergarten 6 Classe de alfabetizac¸a˜o (CA) CA 6 Ensino fundamental I 1st year
Elementary school 7–10 Ensino fundamental I Grade 1–4 7–10 2nd–5th year
Junior high school 11–14 Ensino fundamental II Grade 5–8 11–14 Ensino fundamental II 6th–9th year
High school 15–17 Ensino me´dio Grade 9–11 15–17 Ensino me´dio 10th–12th year
Notes: The “Age” column reﬂects the oﬃcial minimum age for entry. Mandatory ages for schooling before and after November 24, 2005, are shaded in
gray.
Source: Ministry of Education.
306 WORLD DEVELOPMENTcourse/level, and the highest course/level the household mem-
ber has completed if not currently in school. Although the
schooling structure changed during 2005–09, enumerators
were instructed to code the 2009 round per the 2005 schooling
structure for consistency.
We focus on the following set of indicators based on the fol-
lowing information for children aged 6–17 years: an uncondi-
tional measure of whether the child currently participates in
school (“participation”); conditional on a child participating
in school the previous year, whether the child has progressed
from the previous grade level (“grade progression”); condi-
tional on a child participating in school the previous year,
whether the child has repeated the previous grade level (“grade
repetition”); and conditional on a child participating in school
the previous year, whether the child has dropped out
(“dropout”). 8
There are some important limitations to the available infor-
mation. First, the data are constructed as a panel at the house-
hold level, but it is not possible to match individuals within the
household across rounds. 9 Thus, although education indica-
tors can be constructed for children in 2005 and children in
2009, they cannot be linked for the same child across both
rounds. However, because each round includes information
on both previous and current schooling, we can construct
measures related to schooling trajectories. Second, although
enumerators were instructed to maintain the 2005 schooling
structure conventions when coding the 2009 round, inspection
of the data suggests that it was done inconsistently, possibly
because respondents were confused about which structure to
use for their own children’s levels and could not accurately
report them to the enumerator. Thus, although we can infer
whether a particular child has progressed or repeated grades
since the previous year from a respondent’s responses, since
the responses on previous and current levels are likely to be
answered by the respondent with the same schooling structure
in mind (that is, consistently using the 2005 structure or con-
sistently using the 2009 structure), our measure of a child’s
absolute level of schooling may well have measurement error.
As a result, we also cannot construct reliable measures of
whether a child has completed a particular course, such as
whether the child has completed primary school or secondary
school. For this reason, while we report impacts on schooling
levels, we are cautious when interpreting these results, and we
focus more attention on the impacts on school participation
and transitions.
(c) Descriptive statistics on education indicators
In order to interpret the impact estimates, it is helpful to ﬁrst
observe the patterns in schooling outcomes in the full sample
of 6-to-17-year-olds in the 2005 survey round. 10 We initially
consider unconditional school participation. Figure 1, PanelA shows that among both boys and girls, school participation
rates tend to be quite high between ages 7–14 years, but then
steadily decline from age 15–17 (corresponding to ages after
mandatory schooling). Figure 1, Panels B–D show the pattern
of children’s dropout rates, grade progression rates, and grade
repetition rates, conditional on a child being in school the
previous year. Panel B shows that dropout rates mirror
the pattern in participation rates, with dropout relatively low
between ages 7–14, then steadily increasing across ages 15–
17. Panel C shows that grade progression rates slightly
increase then slightly decrease between ages 7–14, then also
fall from age 15–17, whereas Panel D shows that grade repeti-
tion rates are roughly similar after age 9. Across all four mea-
sures (Panels A through D), girls tend to have better outcomes
than boys of the same age. Girls’ participation rates are similar
or slightly higher, particularly at older ages; girls’ dropout
rates are similar or slightly lower, particularly at older ages;
and girls are consistently more likely to progress in grades
and less likely to repeat grades than boys.
Does this gendered pattern persist when we disaggregate by
rural–urban status? In Figure 2, we show participation pat-
terns by age, gender, and rural–urban status. In each category,
participation rates are lower in rural areas than in urban areas.
Girls’ participation rates are higher than boys in both rural
and urban areas for both age groups.
The patterns shown in Figures 1 and 2 might appear surpris-
ing given that it is often assumed that girls schooling lags that
of boys. While certainly once true, it appears that this is no
longer the case in Brazil and the rest of Latin America.
Duryea, Galiani, Nopo, and Piras (2007) analyze the evolution
of gender diﬀerences in schooling attainment in Latin America
and the Caribbean using a cohort analysis. During the four
decades of birth cohorts in their data (1940–80) the gender
gap in attainment moved in favor of females at a rate of
0.27 years of schooling per decade. For the cohort born in
1980, females have, on average, 1=4 of a schooling year more
than males. Table 3 summarizes data on gross secondary
enrollments and rates of secondary school grade repetition
for nine countries that account for 83% of Latin America’s
population. In seven countries, female secondary school
enrollment exceeds male enrollments and in all countries,
grade repetition for boys is higher than for girls.4. MEASURING IMPACT: EMPIRICAL
METHODOLOGY, AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
We seek to estimate average-treatment-on-the-treated
(ATT) impacts of Bolsa Famı´lia on children’s schooling out-
comes. The key challenge to estimating the ATT in any context
is that it aims to measure the diﬀerence between actual out-
comes of a group receiving the program and counterfactual
Figure 1. Participation, dropout, grade progression, and grade repetition rates, by age and sex, 2005.
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Since counterfactual outcomes cannot be directly observed, we
must construct a comparison group of nonrecipients whose
outcomes can be considered valid proxies for program recipi-
ents’ outcomes in the absence of the program. While the AIBF
datasets include both Bolsa Famı´lia recipient households and
non-recipient households, the nature of Bolsa Famı´lia requires
accounting for several sample and methodological consid-
erations to construct valid measures of impact.
In terms of estimation sample, we must use the subset of the
full sample that is most appropriate for estimating ATT
impacts. The most important consideration is that there is a
voluntary component to receiving Bolsa Famı´lia transfers.
Even if observable characteristics are similar across groups
of recipients and nonrecipients, if unobservable characteristics
might lead households to self-select into eligibility and also
correlate with outcomes of interest, this self-selection must
be taken into account to avoid bias. In the context of Bolsa
Famı´lia, registration in the Cadastro is voluntary. All Bolsa
Famı´lia recipients must take the initiative to register in the
Cadastro to be eligible for program receipt; thus comparing
program recipients to nonrecipients not even registered in
the Cadastro might introduce bias. Another issue is that, to
properly interpret the 2005 round as the pre-program period,
we should not consider households that report already receiv-
ing Bolsa Famı´lia or other similar predecessor social programs
(for example, Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentacao, or Auxilio Gas)
in 2005.
Fortunately, our data include a substantial pool of house-
holds that are registered in the Cadastro but do not receive
Bolsa Famı´lia beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, we can deﬁne our treat-
ment group as those households that both received Bolsa
Famı´lia beneﬁts in 2009 and were listed in the Cadastro in
2005 but did not receive transfers from Bolsa Famı´lia or its
predecessor programs in 2005. The potential comparison
group consists of all households that report being listed in
the Cadastro in either 2005 or 2009 but received no BolsaFamı´lia transfers (or predecessor programs) in both 2005
and 2009. Our estimates, for this reason, are all ATT impacts
conditional on Cadastro registration. 11
This approach to addressing biases arising from
self-selection into the registration process and previous pro-
grams gives us the smaller subset of the full sample appropri-
ate for estimating ATT impacts. Out of the 11,433 households
interviewed in 2009, we exclude three groups of sample house-
holds: 1,512 households do not report being listed in the
Cadastro U´nico, 3,443 households report already receiving
Bolsa Famı´lia in the 2005 survey round, and 1,064 households
received a predecessor social program in 2005. Out of the
remaining households, the sample receiving Bolsa Famı´lia
transfers in 2009 includes 2,828 households—the potential
treatment group. The sample not receiving Bolsa Famı´lia
transfers in 2009 includes 2,586 households—the potential
comparison group.
Relatedly, there could be another level of selection: house-
holds that are registered in the Cadastro and deemed eligible
for Bolsa Famı´lia but that choose not to fulﬁll the conditions
should in principle also not be receiving Bolsa Famı´lia. How-
ever, as noted above, the primary role of these conditionalities
is to promote use of health and education resources. Monitor-
ing of compliance is done largely in the spirit of assisting
beneﬁciaries, not punishing them, and fewer than 2% were
removed for noncompliance. Therefore, this source of selec-
tion bias is of lesser concern.
In terms of methodological challenges, the program was not
randomly assigned. Because Bolsa Famı´lia was targeted to
poor households, we expect that recipient households would
be diﬀerent from non-recipient households in general, even
in the program’s absence. If we simply compare the treatment
and comparison groups without accounting for these factors,
we risk attributing all diﬀerences in schooling outcomes
between recipients and nonrecipients to the program, when
other factors correlated with program receipt may also con-
tribute to the diﬀerences. To address this concern, we use
Figure 2. Participation rates disaggregated by area of residence, by age
group and sex, 2005.
308 WORLD DEVELOPMENTpropensity score weighting to account for other observable
diﬀerences between the two. An identifying assumption of this
estimator is that, after controlling for these observable diﬀer-
ences between the treatment and comparison groups, remain-
ing correlates of schooling are uncorrelated with treatment
status.
(b) Propensity score weighting
To adjust for diﬀerences in observable characteristics
between the Bolsa Famı´lia recipients and nonrecipients, we
use a two-step process. We ﬁrst select a comparison group
of nonrecipients likely to be similar to the group of recipients
in terms of observable characteristics. Second, we use estimat-
ed propensity scores to further weight each observation in this
selected comparison group according to its similarity on
observable characteristics to treated observations. In this sub-
section, we describe our implementation of propensity score
weighting.
Propensity score weighting (Hirano et al., 2003) entails esti-
mating and applying weights to statistically balance observ-
able preprogram characteristics between selected treatment
and comparison groups. We estimate a propensity score for
each household based on a range of observable preprogram
characteristics. The propensity scores, p, are used as weights
on the comparison observations: each treatment observation
receives a weight of 1, whereas comparison observations
receive a weight of p/(1  p). Intuitively, comparison house-
holds with similar observable characteristics to treatment
households are assigned high weights, whereas comparisonTable 3. Schooling attainments by sex
Gross secondary school enrollmen
Females Ma
Argentina 95.1 85
Brazil 110.9 10
Chile 90.7 88
Colombia 100.9 92
Ecuador 88.4 87
Guatemala 61.8 67
Mexico 91.9 85
Peru 90.6 92
Venezuela 86.4 78
Notes: Source, World Bank (2013). School attainments are for 2010 except fohouseholds with relatively dissimilar observable characteristics
to treatment households are assigned relatively less weight. By
placing these weights on comparison households pre-selected
to be similar on some dimensions to treatment households,
we further balance observable characteristics between treat-
ment and comparison households, even if they were unbal-
anced before weighting. Hirano et al. (2003) show that
under a set of reasonable assumptions, applying propensity
score weights leads to unbiased impact estimates of ATT. They
also show that the observables used to construct the propensi-
ty score can be directly included in the weighted regression as
well, to account for additional variation in the dependent vari-
able and thereby lower standard errors, which we do in all our
estimates. A summary of the theoretical basis for propensity
score weighting is presented in the Appendix.
We also include sampling and attrition weights in the
estimation. Incorporating these weights allows us to interpret
our estimates of ATT as representative of the treated
population, adjusting for oversampling of certain types of
households in the baseline and selective attrition of other types
of households. The main disadvantage of using propensity
score weighting as opposed to matching methods is the higher
variance of the estimator (Freedman & Berk, 2008). We
describe our approach to dealing with high variance in the
Appendix.
(c) Implementation of propensity score weighting
For each household in our estimation sample, we estimate
the propensity score for the household to be in the treatment
group. We include as covariates observable characteristics cor-
related both with the probability of a household being in the
treatment group and with children’s education outcomes con-
ditional on treatment status. Doing so addresses the bias
otherwise associated with nonrandom program assignment
based on observable characteristics also correlated with key
outcomes. We start by selecting a large set of observable pre-
program characteristics we perceive as having potential to cor-
relate with both program receipt and our outcomes of interest
conditional on program receipt status. The set of observables
chosen includes variables used to determine selection of house-
holds into Bolsa Famı´lia (drawn from the oﬃcial criteria used
at the national level for the program’s beneﬁciary selection), as
well as key household and municipality characteristics that
may shape outcomes conditional on receiving Bolsa Famı´lia. 12
For estimation of the propensity score model, we allow a
ﬂexible relationship between the probability of treatment
and these variables. Rather than imposing a functional form,
we follow a stepwise algorithm for including the subset ofin nine Latin American countries
t Grade repetition rate, secondary school
les Females Males
.4 8.2 11.6
0.9 – –
.1 5.1 7.5
.0 1.7 2.7
.2 2.9 4.9
.1 2.1 3.0
.7 1.1 1.9
.1 4.3 6.8
.8 3.9 6.7
r Brazil for which the most recent data are 2005.
Figure 3. Overlap in estimated propensity scores between treatment and
comparison groups.
THE IMPACT OF BOLSA FAMI´LIA ON SCHOOLING 309covariates that are indeed signiﬁcant predictors of treatment
and that give an approximation to nonparametric estimation
(Imbens, Newey, & Ridder, 2005).
This approach to estimating propensity scores follows
Hirano and Imbens (2001) and Imbens et al. (2005). Following
the algorithm, we initially estimate a logit model including
only region dummy variables interacted with rural/urban
dummies, to ensure that we account for broad diﬀerences in
market conditions. We weight the regression by sampling
weights from the AIBF-1 data multiplied by attrition weights.
Next, we start to consider the set of N variables at the house-
hold and municipality level as possible covariates for inclusion
in the logit model. We estimate N regressions, each sequential-
ly and separately including one variable to the basic logit mod-
el. We keep the variable that reduces the log pseudo-likelihood
the most. We then take the remaining list of N  1 variables,
and sequentially add the remaining N  1 variables to the log-
it model, again keeping the one that maximizes the reduction
of the log pseudo-likelihood. We follow this procedure until
the reduction hits a threshold that roughly corresponds to
adding a variable to the logit model that has a t-ratio of 1,
indicating that the remaining variables in the list have little
predictive power.
We next take the K covariates that are chosen in the ﬁrst
step, and in the second step we square all of them and interact
them with one another, creating an additional K(K + 1)/2
variables. We then add these second-order terms to the model
sequentially until no term exceeds a threshold that loosely
indicates signiﬁcant predictive power (in this case, a t-ratio
that corresponds to a p-value of 0.1). We repeat this procedure
for each of the three comparisons, therefore letting the data
tell us the relationship between Bolsa Famı´lia eligibility and
potential explanatory variables. 13
With the propensity scores estimated using this algorithm,
we then compare distributions of estimated propensity scores
across treatment and comparison groups. We ﬁnd consider-
able overlap (Figure 3), suggesting that observables predicting
receipt of Bolsa Famı´lia are distributed similarly across the
two groups. The overlapping distributions suggest that weight-
ing observations according to estimated propensity scores may
address imbalances between the two groups. Indeed, as we
show in Appendix Table A.3, applying propensity score
weights to the estimation sample balances average
pre-program characteristics between treatment and compar-
ison groups. Although some signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist
between treatment and comparison groups before application
of propensity weights, we ﬁnd no average diﬀerences between
groups that are statistically signiﬁcant after the application of
propensity weights. Balancing occurs even among characteris-
tics not directly included in propensity score estimation. We
thus conclude that the propensity scores account for
signiﬁcant pre-program diﬀerences between treatment and
comparison groups.
We also apply the propensity score weights to our key
schooling indicators and measure the diﬀerence in mean values
of these outcomes between treatment and comparison groups
in the 2005 survey (Table 4). 14 Although there are statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in mean values of these indicators with-
out propensity score weights included, we ﬁnd no diﬀerences
that are signiﬁcant at the 10% level or lower once the propen-
sity score weights are incorporated, and magnitudes of all the
diﬀerences are close to zero. Again, these pre-program school-
ing outcomes were not directly included as covariates in
estimating the propensity scores. We therefore conclude that
propensity scores also balance baseline outcomes between
our treatment and comparison groups, giving us conﬁdenceto proceed with the propensity-score-weighted estimation of
impacts on schooling.
(c) Impact estimation
Our results are based on single-diﬀerence estimates of
individual-level outcomes measured in 2009 (in AIBF-2) using
household-level propensity score weights estimated on observ-
ables from 2005 (in AIBF-1). Because we can link households
but not individuals across survey rounds, we estimate impacts
by diﬀerencing average outcomes between the treatment and
comparison groups in 2009—using the propensity score
weights that balance pre-program schooling outcomes and
other characteristics between the two groups—rather than
by double diﬀerencing. Pre-program balancing indicates that
no signiﬁcant pre-program diﬀerences remain once our
propensity score weights are used. Therefore, although
single-diﬀerence estimates may have larger standard errors,
the estimates are theoretically unbiased.5. RESULTS—IMPACT ESTIMATES ON EDUCATION
INDICATORS
Given the patterns of outcomes shown above, we disaggre-
gate impacts by age and sex subgroups (Table 5) and addition-
ally by location (Table 6). 15 Table 5, Panel A, shows the
impacts of receiving Bolsa Famı´lia on school participation—
the unconditional probability of a child participating in
school—among all children and disaggregated by sex. Bolsa
Famı´lia increases girls’ school participation by 8.2 percentage
points. This eﬀect is essentially the same for girls 6–14 years
(7.3 percentage points) and girls 15–17 years (8 percentage
points). There is no impact on boys’ participation. From Panel
A, we see that across all children aged 6–17 years, there is only
a weakly signiﬁcant increase in the overall participation rate,
by 4.5 percentage points.
Next, we examine impacts on schooling transitions. Panel B
shows that the program causes signiﬁcant increases in
overall grade progression among girls aged 6–17 years (10.4
percentage points), with the largest increases among
15-to-17 year-old girls (20.9 percentage points). Panels C
and D indicate that the increase is driven by improved
schooling eﬃciency—conditional on attending school, grade
repetition for girls 15–17 falls considerably, by 17 percentage
Table 4. Diﬀerences in mean schooling outcomes between treatment and comparison groups in 2005, without vs. with propensity score weights
Diﬀerences without propensity score weights Diﬀerences with propensity score weights
All Rural Urban All Rural Urban
Panel A: Participation rates
Ages 6–14 years 0.005* 0.010 0.007 0.036 0.012 0.043
(0.007) (0.019) (0.007) (0.039) (0.029) (0.049)
Ages 15–17 years 0.010 0.063 ** 0.027 ** 0.044 0.074 0.035
(0.012) (0.031) (0.012) (0.052) (0.106) (0.060)
Observations 7,820 1,512 6,186 7,820 1,512 6,186
Panel B: Grade progression rates
Ages 6–14 years 0.037*** 0.006 0.040*** 0.012 0.062 0.035
(0.012) (0.031) (0.013) (0.033) (0.082) (0.035)
Ages 15–17 years 0.024 0.081 0.057 ** 0.038 0.057 0.029
(0.020) (0.051) (0.023) (0.066) (0.143) (0.075)
Observations 6,056 1,140 4,814 6,056 1,140 4,814
Panel C: Grade repetition rates
Ages 6–14 years 0.032*** 0.010 0.039*** 0.015 0.073 0.042
(0.011) (0.028) (0.012) (0.033) (0.082) (0.034)
Ages 15–17 years 0.001 0.055 0.016 0.014 0.126 0.017
(0.019) (0.046) (0.021) (0.044) (0.143) (0.038)
Observations 6,056 1,140 4,814 6,056 1,140 4,814
Panel D: Dropout rates
Ages 6–14 years 0.004 0.016 0.000 0.003 0.011 0.007
(0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006)
Ages 15–17 years 0.023 ** 0.026 0.041 *** 0.024 0.069 0.047
(0.010) (0.025) (0.011) (0.056) (0.043) (0.069)
Observations 6,056 1,140 4,814 6,056 1,140 4,814
Notes: Each cell shows the diﬀerence in mean values of the speciﬁed outcome in 2005 between the treatment and comparison groups, for the subgroup
indicated. Standard errors of diﬀerences in means are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
310 WORLD DEVELOPMENTpoints. While the likelihood of drop out falls for girls in both
age groups, this impact is not statistically signiﬁcant. By con-
trast, there is no evidence that Bolsa Famı´lia increases boys’
grade progression even when we separate our sample by age,
and the diﬀerence in impact between boys and girls is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. However, this result masks oﬀsetting impacts
on boys’ grade repetition and dropout. Bolsa Famı´lia increases
the likelihood of grade repetition by boys aged 6–14 and 15–17
by 5 and 5.3 percentage points, respectively and this eﬀect is
marginally signiﬁcant when we aggregate these age
groups. Bolsa Famı´lia reduces dropouts by boys aged 15–17
by 7.2 percentage points. In other words, while Bolsa Famı´lia
keeps older boys in school, because these older boys are also
more likely to be repeating a grade, there is no impact on
grade progression.
The ﬁndings in Table 5 are robust to varying the number of
covariates included and the matching methodology. Appendix
Table A.4 shows that results are robust to including covariates
in the regression that were allowed as potential covariates in
the propensity score algorithm but not selected by it. In
Appendix Table A.5, we show that after removing the sam-
pling and attrition weights, estimates from the propensity
score weighted regression methodology we use yield very simi-
lar ﬁndings to those from various matching methodologies
without sampling and attrition weights, including various
speciﬁcations of propensity score matching and covariate
matching. 16
Table 6 disaggregates results by whether the child lives in an
urban or rural locality. For girls, the impact on school par-
ticipation is conﬁned to rural areas with no impact found inurban localities. The positive impact is large in magnitude,
11.1 percentage points for girls aged 6–14 and 17.7 percentage
points for girls 15–17. For boys, there is no impact on par-
ticipation in urban areas and no impact in rural areas when
we aggregate across all boys aged 6–17. However, when we
disaggregate by age, we ﬁnd a large impact on school par-
ticipation by boys 15–17 in rural areas. The size of this eﬀect,
18.4 percentage points, is equal to the impact on girls’
participation in this age group.
Table 6 shows that Bolsa Famı´lia has a large eﬀect on grade
progression for all girls living in rural areas with the eﬀect larg-
er among girls aged 15–17 (22.5 percentage points) than girls
aged 6–14 (14.6 percentage points). In urban areas, there is
also a large eﬀect on girls’ grade progression among young
women 15–17 (18.0 percentage points) but not among girls
6–14. There is no impact on boys’ grade progression in either
urban or rural areas. The diﬀerences between impacts on boys
and girls in rural areas are statistically signiﬁcant.
Among girls aged 15–17 in rural areas, the increase in grade
progression is a consequence of both reduced grade repetition
(13.3 percentage points) and reduced dropout (9.2 percentage
points) though neither of these impacts are statistically sig-
niﬁcant, possibly because of the relatively small sample sizes
we are working with for locationally disaggregated results.
Among younger girls, improved grade progression results
almost entirely from reduced dropout (14.4 percentage
points).
For boys, the rural/urban disaggregation produces only one
statistically signiﬁcant improvement in grade progression,
grade repetition, and dropout, a 6.9 percentage point
Table 5. Impact of Bolsa Famı´lia on schooling outcomes by sex, based on propensity score weighted regression estimates, 2009
All Disaggregated by sex
Girls Boys Diﬀerence
Panel A: Participation
6–17 years 0.045* 0.082** 0.012 0.070
(0.026) (0.033) (0.035) (0.048)
6–14 years 0.030 0.073** 0.009 0.082
(0.029) (0.035) (0.039) (0.052)
15–17 years 0.073* 0.080* 0.086 0.005
(0.044) (0.046) (0.062) (0.077)
Panel B: Grade progression
6–17 years 0.039 0.104** 0.031 0.134**
(0.034) (0.047) (0.036) (0.059)
6–14 years 0.002 0.041 0.038 0.079
(0.036) (0.054) (0.041) (0.067)
15–17 years 0.112 ** 0.209 *** 0.022 0.187**
(0.048) (0.064) (0.051) (0.082)
Panel C: Grade repetition
6–17 years 0.013 0.067 0.054* 0.122**
(0.031) (0.044) (0.032) (0.055)
6–14 years 0.014 0.020 0.053 0.073
(0.032) (0.048) (0.036) (0.060)
15–17 years 0.058 0.170 *** 0.050 0.220***
(0.043) (0.053) (0.049) (0.072)
Panel D: Dropout
6–17 years 0.027 0.036 0.024 0.013
(0.021) (0.031) (0.022) (0.038)
6–14 years 0.016 0.021 0.015 0.006
(0.022) (0.033) (0.025) (0.041)
15–17 years 0.054 0.039 0.072 ** 0.033
(0.034) (0.046) (0.029) (0.054)
Observations, Panel A 6,507 3,133 3,374
Observations, Panels B, C and D 4,638 2,279 2,359
Notes: Impact estimates in Panel A represent the diﬀerence in the probability that a child participating in Bolsa Famı´lia currently attends school, compared
with the comparison group. Impact estimates in Panels B, C, and D are estimated conditional on the child being in school in the previous year. All
estimates account for propensity score weights, sample weights, and attrition weights. Standard errors in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
THE IMPACT OF BOLSA FAMI´LIA ON SCHOOLING 311reduction in dropout for young men aged 15–17 in urban
areas. The results in Panel D suggest that in rural areas, drop-
out by boys aged 15–17 falls by an amount equivalent to that
of girls (9.6 percentage points) but as with girls, the coeﬃcient
estimate is not statistically signiﬁcant. Unlike the results for
girls, the signs on the grade repetition coeﬃcients tend to be
positive and in some cases the magnitudes are large. For exam-
ple, there is a 10.5 percentage point increase in grade repetition
for rural boys aged 6–14 and while it is not statistically sig-
niﬁcant, there is an adverse impact on grade progression for
rural boys in this age category, a reduction of 13.4 percentage
points which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
What do these results imply for grade attainment? With the
caveat that the data on absolute levels of grades attained may
well have measurement error, we ﬁnd no impact on grades
attained in urban areas on boys or girls in any age group. In
rural areas, we ﬁnd that Bolsa Famı´lia increases girls’ grade
attainment, by 1.1 grades among girls aged 6–14 and 0.7
grades among girls aged 15–17 with these impacts signiﬁcant
at the 5% and 10% percent levels, respectively. Among boys
aged 15–17, Bolsa Famı´lia increases grades attained by 1.3
grades but reduces it by one grade for boys aged 6–14. Bothestimates are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. These estimates are
consistent with the results from Table 6 that showed that Bolsa
Famı´lia increased school participation among boys aged 15–17
but slowed grade progression among younger boys. 17(b) Impact pathways
While evaluations provide evidence of the impact of an
intervention, a criticism of our approach, and one common
to impact evaluations in general, is that they do not explain
why we observe these results. While we cannot provide deﬁni-
tive evidence on the impact pathways that lead to these ﬁnd-
ings, we can provide some suggestive evidence based on the
data.
Our starting point is the notion of an education production
function in which schooling attainments are a function of
inputs provided by schools, by parents and by students
themselves. Unlike some CCT programs like Progresa/
Oportunidades in Mexico, Bolsa Famı´lia does not directly
aﬀect school inputs. So the impact pathway must lie with
inputs provided by parents or by children.
Table 6. Impact of Bolsa Famı´lia on schooling outcomes by location and sex, based on propensity score weighted regression estimates 2009
Rural Urban
All Disaggregated by sex All Disaggregated by sex
Girls Boys Diﬀerence Girls Boys Diﬀerence
Panel A: Participation
6–17 years 0.074** 0.157*** 0.006 0.163** 0.033 0.062 0.003 0.058
(0.037) (0.053) (0.039) (0.066) (0.030) (0.033) (0.042) (0.054)
6–14 years 0.003 0.111** 0.054 0.165** 0.021 0.060 0.016 0.076
(0.034) (0.056) (0.033) (0.065) (0.034) (0.035) (0.046) (0.058)
15–17 years 0.149*** 0.177** 0.184*** 0.007 0.064 0.066 0.059 0.006
(0.050) (0.077) (0.064) (0.100) (0.053) (0.048) (0.080) (0.092)
Panel B: Grade progression
6–17 years 0.104 0.279*** 0.097 0.376*** 0.017 0.069 0.014 0.083
(0.072) (0.075) (0.065) (0.100) (0.036) (0.053) (0.039) (0.066)
6–14 years 0.027 0.146** 0.134* 0.280*** 0.003 0.037 0.028 0.066
(0.063) (0.071) (0.075) (0.103) (0.041) (0.061) (0.045) (0.076)
15–17 years 0.201** 0.225** 0.116 0.109 0.086 0.180** 0.024 0.156
(0.084) (0.106) (0.085) (0.136) (0.052) (0.077) (0.057) (0.095)
Panel C: Grade repetition
6–17 years 0.023 0.103 0.085 0.188* 0.007 0.058 0.038 0.096
(0.072) (0.067) (0.070) (0.097) (0.031) (0.048) (0.035) (0.059)
6–14 years 0.064 0.002 0.105 0.107 0.000 0.046 0.042 0.088
(0.056) (0.056) (0.075) (0.093) (0.037) (0.055) (0.039) (0.068)
15–17 years 0.098 0.133 0.019 0.113 0.041 0.135** 0.045 0.180**
(0.075) (0.085) (0.072) (0.111) (0.044) (0.064) (0.054) (0.084)
Panel D: Dropout
6–17 years 0.080 0.176*** 0.012 0.188*** 0.009 0.011 0.024 0.014
(0.043) (0.056) (0.036) (0.067) (0.022) (0.031) (0.023) (0.038)
6–14 years 0.037 0.144** 0.029 0.173*** 0.003 0.009 0.014 0.023
(0.039) (0.056) (0.025) (0.062) (0.023) (0.033) (0.028) (0.043)
15–17 years 0.104** 0.092 0.096 0.004 0.045 0.046 0.069** 0.023
(0.044) (0.061) (0.059) (0.085) (0.039) (0.053) (0.028) (0.060)
Observations, Panel A 3,374 593 656 3,133 2,540 2,718
Observations, Panels B, C and D 967 466 501 3,671 1,813 1,858
Notes: See Table 5.
312 WORLD DEVELOPMENTPerhaps the most straightforward explanation focuses on
the idea that in the absence of well-functioning credit markets,
parental investment in children’s schooling is constrained by
household income. Bolsa Famı´lia relaxes this constraint, and
at the margin leads to increased parental investment in chil-
dren’s schooling. The explanation is consistent with some of
our ﬁndings, such as increased participation rates by boys
and girls aged 15–17 in rural areas, but not others—such as
the positive impact on grade progression and reduced grade
repetition for girls (but not boys) in rural areas. Further, we
estimated the impact of Bolsa Famı´lia on school-related expen-
ditures for our full sample and the same disaggregations (by
sex, age, and location) used in Tables 5 and 6. We ﬁnd no evi-
dence that Bolsa Famı´lia aﬀects these expenditure levels. This
result also suggests that something apart from a pure income
eﬀect is at work here.
Another possibility is that Bolsa Famı´lia changes
decision-making authority within the household. In a related
paper (de Brauw, Gilligan, Hoddinott, & Roy, 2014), we
explore this idea using the AIBF data and methods similar
to those described above. Across the full sample, Bolsa Famı´lia
has no eﬀect on women’s decision-making autonomy with
respect to children’s school attendance. When we disaggregate
by location, we ﬁnd that women who are Bolsa Famı´lia beneﬁ-
ciaries in urban areas, but not rural areas, report that they aremore likely to have exclusive control over school attendance
decisions. Given that most impacts are found in rural areas,
changes in decision-making power do not appear to be the pri-
mary driver of changes in schooling outcomes.
Finally, Bolsa Famı´lia may lead to changes in the amount of
time children can spend on school, and school-related tasks
such as studying at home. Consider a model of household
labor supply where labor is allocated to both income gen-
eration and domestic tasks such as meal preparation, cleaning,
and so on. In rural areas, assume that fathers and sons’ time
allocations to these activities are substitutes, mothers and
daughters’ time allocations are substitutes but that fathers
and daughters’ time and mothers and sons’ time are not sub-
stitutes. de Brauw, Gilligan, Hoddinott, and Roy (in press)
ﬁnd that in rural areas, Bolsa Famı´lia reduces women’s work
in income-generating activities by four hours per week while
increasing men’s work per week by four hours. By contrast,
there is no impact of Bolsa Famı´lia on total hours worked
by men or by women in urban areas. We have limited informa-
tion on children’s time allocations. Using the same data set
and the same methods used to assess impacts on schooling,
Bolsa Famı´lia is shown to have no impact on the likelihood
that children work outside the home or on the likelihood that
either boys or girls undertake domestic tasks. However, condi-
tional on doing any domestic work, girls work three hours less
THE IMPACT OF BOLSA FAMI´LIA ON SCHOOLING 313per week; boys work ﬁve hours less. Unfortunately, we do not
know how many hours per week boys and girls spend study-
ing. If girls (but not boys) use the additional time made avail-
able to them for studying, it would explain why Bolsa Famı´lia
improves grade progression and reduces dropout for girls but
not boys.
6. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we enter the contested literature on the impact
of Bolsa Famı´lia on children’s schooling. We use longitudinal
household data and propensity score weighting methods to
evaluate its eﬀects on a wide range of schooling outcomes.
We disaggregate by sex, age, and location. These disaggrega-
tions prove critical in uncovering Bolsa Famı´lia’s impacts.
We ﬁnd that Bolsa Famı´lia increases girls’ school participation
by 8.2 percentage points with comparable eﬀects for younger
and older girls. There is no impact on boys’ participation.
Bolsa Famı´lia has a large eﬀect on grade progression for all
girls living in rural areas with the eﬀect larger for girls aged
15–17 (22.5 percentage points) than girls aged 6–14 (14.6 per-
centage points). In urban areas, there is also a large eﬀect on
girls’ grade progression for young women 15–17 (18.0 percent-
age points) but not for girls 6–14. There is no impact on boys’
grade progression in either urban or rural areas. For boys, the
rural/urban disaggregation produces only one statistically sig-
niﬁcant improvement in grade progression, grade repetition,
and dropout, a 6.9 percentage point reduction in dropout
for young men aged 15–17 in urban areas. In rural areas, drop-
out by boys 15–17 falls by an amount equivalent to that of
girls (9.6 percentage points) but as with girls, this impact is
not statistically signiﬁcant. Unlike the results for girls, the
signs on the grade repetition impacts tend to be positive and
in some cases the magnitudes are large. For example, there
is a 10.5 percentage point increase in grade repetition for rural
boys 6–14. While we cannot deﬁnitively uncover the mechan-
isms that generate these results, evidence from complementary
empirical analysis suggests that the income eﬀect of Bolsa
Famı´lia is only partially responsible for the impacts we observehere. In other CCT programs found in Latin America, most
notably Mexico’s Progresa/Oportunidades program, the
transfer schedule varies by sex and by current grade level so
as to provide additional inducement for households to send
girls to school. But in Brazil, the stronger impacts for girls
cannot be driven by diﬀering direct incentives since Bolsa
Famı´lia’s payment amounts do not diﬀer by sex. It is possible
that the reduction in the amount of time girls spend on domes-
tic work allows them more time to study which accounts for
the beneﬁcial eﬀect of Bolsa Famı´lia on girls’ grade progres-
sion. However, because we do not have information on time
spent studying, this argument should be seen as speculative.
We note several caveats to our ﬁndings. First, although we
would ideally use double-diﬀerence to compare changes in
the same individuals over time across treatment and compar-
ison groups, we cannot calculate these diﬀerences as there
are problems linking individuals in the same household across
rounds. However, given that the use of propensity score
weights gives balancing in our pre-program covariates and
pre-program education indicators, our single-diﬀerence esti-
mates are unlikely to be driven by pre-program diﬀerences.
Second, while we would prefer to use objective measures of
schooling, our measures of education indicators are
self-reported. However, our aggregate results are very similar
to aggregate results in Glewwe and Kassouf (2012) that draw
on administrative school census data, which suggests bias
from self-reporting (which could in principle be systematically
correlated with program receipt) is not driving results in our
key education indicators.
Across some schooling outcomes, Bolsa Famı´lia appears to
be aﬀecting the gender gap in schooling—but contrary to what
is often assumed about these gaps—it is widening a gap that
already favors girls. Although policies that favor girls’ educa-
tion are worthwhile for numerous reasons when a gender gap
exists, a widening opposite gender gap suggests it might be
time to at the very least use gender neutral policies, or for
more research to be done to better understand the reasons that
policies such as Bolsa Famı´lia are more successful at promot-
ing older girls’ education than boys’.NOTES1. For reference, GDP per capita was about $3,000/year in 2003 when
the program began, or $250/month.
2. For example, in some municipalities, oﬃcials go door to door for
registration, but in others, households are asked to register at a central
place, such as a school, or to attend a town hall meeting to register.
3. We could not obtain an algorithm for how the quotas were calculated
from poverty map characteristics, suggesting that the mapping may have
been rough rather than derived through a precise calculation.
Municipality-level quotas have also gradually increased over time, as
program coverage has expanded.
4. We also could not obtain a precise algorithm for how these criteria
were combined and used to prioritize households, suggesting that the
prioritization may have been through visual scanning rather than
consistent constructions of rankings.
5. A potential concern may be that political factors aﬀect municipality
quotas or prioritization of households within municipalities, introducing
another level of selection into the treatment group. However, Lindert et al.
(2007) document that in practice the risks of political manipulation are“minimal in scope, due to the technical design of the program.” Three
federal control agencies constitute an oﬃcial “oversights and control
network” for Bolsa Famı´lia and hold responsibility for routine audits.
6. The change was made in the law Projecto de Lei n. 3.675/04.
7. Minimum working age in Brazil is 16 years for paid labor, with the
exception of an apprenticeship, for which it is 14 years.
8. For each child that is reported to currently participate in school, the
data also include the household’s self-report on how many days in the past
seven days the child’s school was open and on how many of those days the
child attended school. We constructed attendance rates out of this
information and found nearly no variation. Nearly all households
reported that children who participated in school attended every day that
it was open in the last seven days. Given that there is insuﬃcient variation
for meaningful analysis, we do not present an analysis of impacts on the
attendance rate.
9. Individual identiﬁcation numbers were inadvertently not kept intact
across rounds, and attempts to link by name, sex, and age were not
successful.
314 WORLD DEVELOPMENT10. Patterns described here are also observed when we restrict analysis to
the 2005 sample that does not receive Bolsa Famı´lia or to the 2009
comparison group (see below). Thus, we can be conﬁdent that the patterns
shown here for 2005 are not driven by the small proportion of households
already receiving Bolsa Famı´lia beneﬁts.
11. As described earlier, there is also heterogeneity across municipalities
in the extent to which potential beneﬁciaries needed to take initiative to
register in the Cadastro. However, it is reasonable to assume that,
averaged across all municipalities, the groups are similar.
12. The covariates are shown in the Appendix. They include the
following categories: municipality-level characteristics including demo-
graphics that might aﬀect the municipality quota, municipality-level
characteristics that reﬂect initial conditions of available health and
education infrastructure, household-level characteristics including
demographics and poverty indicators that might determine eligibility
given the municipality quota, and household-level characteristics that
might reﬂect initial conditions shaping the impact of receiving Bolsa
Famı´lia transfers.
13. If variables are not selected by the algorithm, they do not have
signiﬁcant predictive power in explaining treatment. In other words, a
variable that is not selected is not correlated with treatment status. Many
of the variables included in the model by the algorithm are also
determinants of children’s education outcomes. As a robustness check,
we estimated the model including the full set of original potential
covariates, in case the algorithm removed important variables that are
determinants of children’s education outcomes conditional on treatment
status. Results from this model (shown in Table A.4) are similar to our
main results and do not substantially change our ﬁndings.
14. Table 4 shows balancing in 2005 over mean outcomes aggregating
over boys and girls. We also tested and found balanced samples between
the treatment and comparison groups on the same variables in separate
samples of boys and girls.
15. Ideally we would separately estimate impacts on 6-year-olds, since
participation is relatively low for them in the overall sample. However,
within our smaller estimation sample of treatment and comparisonhouseholds, there are too few observations to conﬁdently estimate impacts
on only that age group. Therefore, we group the 6-year-olds into the
“6-to-14” age group.16. Because matching methodologies are not able to account well for
probability weights such as the sampling and attrition weights used in
our main estimates, Appendix Table A.5 excludes sampling and
attrition weights across all speciﬁcations shown for the comparability
of propensity score weighted regression results and matching results. As
expected, the propensity score weighted regression results without
sampling and attrition weights are very diﬀerent from those with the
weights in Table 5, but are similar to the matching results without the
weights.17. We attempted various other disaggregations of these data, but small
samples, together with an estimator that tends to produce impact
estimates that are unbiased but high-variance, imply lack of power to
demonstrate ﬁnely disaggregated impacts of Bolsa Famı´lia on schooling
measures. However, one disaggregation worth noting is the set of results
obtained when we disaggregate by region. Across a range of outcomes, we
observe positive impacts on schooling outcomes in the north-east,
historically the most deprived region in Brazil. In 2005, for example,
grade progression rates for children aged 6–14 were 5–10 percentage
points lower in the northeast than in the southeast; grade repetition rates
for children in this age group were typically 5–10 percentage points higher
than elsewhere.18. Note that this approach diﬀers from matching methods, in that for
matching, only certain observations out of the eligible comparison group
are used—based on some metric of similarity to treated observations,
depending on the particular method—but that typically each of those
observations is then assigned a weight of 1. In propensity score weighting,
all observations in the comparison group selected by the researcher are
used, but each is assigned a weight based on its propensity score. This
approach is preferable for our context, since incorporating sample weights
and attrition weights is then relatively straightforward.19. We include these observables as covariates in all of our estimates.REFERENCESAhmed, A. U., Adato, M., Kudat, A., Gilligan, D., Roopnaraine, T., &
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APPENDIX A.
Construction of attrition weights
Deﬁning attrition as households that were found in the 2005
survey but not in the 2009 survey, we follow the correction
procedure outlined in Fitzgerald, Gottschalk, and Moﬃtt
(1998a, 1998b). We ﬁrst estimate a probit model to explain
whether or not a household is lost to attrition, conditioning
on exogenous characteristics. From that we can construct
weights that take into account the likelihood that households
did, or did not, attrit from the sample. We calculate the pre-
dicted probability that a household does not attrit. The
weights are the inverse of those predicted probabilities. House-
holds with low probabilities of being re-interviewed, but who
are traced and re-interviewed, receive higher weights. We
include these attrition weights in all of the estimates reported
in the paper.
We ﬁnd large diﬀerences in attrition rates between regions
and rural/urban location in the sample; attrition was highest
in the Center-West region and the Southeast, and lowest in
the North and Northeast. Smaller households were also
more likely to be lost to attrition; attrition rates were quite
similar for other important variables, such as Cadastro
registration. Correlates of attrition are shown in Appendix
Table A.1.Theoretical basis for propensity score weighting
We present here a brief overview of the theoretical basis for
propensity score weighting, based on Hirano et al. (2003).
The aim of our evaluation is to construct, for a range of out-
comes, an estimate of the average impact of Bolsa Famı´lia on
those that receive it—referred to as the average impact of the
treatment on the treated (ATT). The formalization of this con-
cept is as follows.
Let Yt
1 be a household’s outcome in time period t if it is a
recipient of Bolsa Famı´lia, let Yt
0 be that household’s outcome
in time period t if it does not receive any program beneﬁts, and
let D be an indicator variable equal to 1 if the household
receives program beneﬁts and 0 if not (that is, an indicator
of “treatment”). The impact of the program is just the change
in the outcome caused by receiving beneﬁts: D = Yt
1  Yt0.
For each household, either only Yt
1 or only Yt
0 is observed
in any period t.
We wish to estimate the diﬀerence between the outcome that
treated households would realize if they receive the program
and the outcome that treated households would realize if they
do not receive the program in period t, given a vector X of
observable characteristics of the households:
ATT ¼ EðDjX ;D ¼ 1Þ ¼ EðY 1t  Y 0t jX ;D ¼ 1Þ ¼ EðY 1t jX ;D
¼ 1Þ  EðY 0t jX ;D ¼ 1Þ:
However, only Yt
1 and not Yt
0 is observed for households
treated in period t, that is, those with D = 1. Because
E(Yt
0|X,D = 1) is not observed, we must construct a statistical
comparison group for recipients out of our observations on
non-recipients, that is, households with D = 0. In particular,
we must construct a group of non-recipients and then adjust
it in such a way that balances any observable characteristics
X potentially correlated both with treatment status and the
outcome conditional on treatment status.
One way of doing so involves estimating a “propensity
score,” P(X) = Pr(D = 1|X). This propensity score is the pre-
dicted probability that any household is a program recipient
based only on its observable characteristics X. The approach
of propensity-weighted regression entails the researcher select-
ing a set of non-recipients to use as a comparison group, then
using estimated propensity scores for program receipt to more
heavily weight the comparison observations with higher
propensity scores. The validity of this approach rests in part
on two assumptions:
EðY 0t jX ;D ¼ 1Þ ¼ EðY 0t jX ;D ¼ 0Þ; ðA1Þ
and
0 < P ðX Þ < 1: ðA2Þ
Expression (A1) assumes “conditional mean independence,”
that is, that conditional on X, nonparticipants have the same
mean outcomes as participants would have if they did not
receive the program. Expression (A2) assumes that, based only
on the set of observables X, all observations in the comparison
group have positive predicted probability of being treated.
We ﬁrst consider the case without sampling or attrition weights.
Under (A1), (A2), and several other technical assumptions,
Hirano et al. show that we obtain an unbiased estimate of
ATT through a weighted regression framework, if the ratio
of assigned weights is P ðX Þ
1P ðX Þ : 1 for comparison: treatment
observations. 18
316 WORLD DEVELOPMENTHirano et al. also show that the observables X used to con-
struct the propensity score can be directly included in this
weighted regression to account for additional variation and
thereby improve precision. 19
It is straightforward to extend this methodology to the case
where, as in this evaluation, there are also sampling weights
and attrition weights. These weights can simply be multiplied
to the propensity-score weights to derive an “eﬀective weight”
to be used in the weighted regression.APPENDIX B. SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.worlddev.2015.02.001.ScienceDirect
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